<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
		>
<channel>
	<title>Comments for Fluidian</title>
	<atom:link href="http://fluidian.fr/en/comments/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://fluidian.fr/en/</link>
	<description>CFD experts</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Mon, 21 May 2012 07:02:14 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2.1</generator>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on News November 2011 by ovjzbicpz</title>
		<link>http://fluidian.fr/en/2011/12/13/news-november-2011/#comment-11</link>
		<dc:creator>ovjzbicpz</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 21 May 2012 07:02:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fluidian.fr/?p=1891#comment-11</guid>
		<description>Uh7kww , [url=http://yuasykwpxmnl.com/]yuasykwpxmnl[/url], [link=http://iovcmineeaan.com/]iovcmineeaan[/link], http://mcctqtnppqgw.com/</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Uh7kww , [url=http://yuasykwpxmnl.com/]yuasykwpxmnl[/url], [link=http://iovcmineeaan.com/]iovcmineeaan[/link], <a href="http://mcctqtnppqgw.com/" rel="nofollow">http://mcctqtnppqgw.com/</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on News November 2011 by Bernhard</title>
		<link>http://fluidian.fr/en/2011/12/13/news-november-2011/#comment-10</link>
		<dc:creator>Bernhard</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 May 2012 09:30:38 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fluidian.fr/?p=1891#comment-10</guid>
		<description>military is a great way to go.which service denedps on what you want. if you join the army they give you a ton of cash all branches offer the same as far as educationlook at it like this, airforce = smart people, harder to get inarmy = not so smart, their desperate to get peoplenavy = travelers, not so hard to get in, a lot to domarines = killers, sharp and tough, you will be busy always..a lot of pride</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>military is a great way to go.which service denedps on what you want. if you join the army they give you a ton of cash all branches offer the same as far as educationlook at it like this, airforce = smart people, harder to get inarmy = not so smart, their desperate to get peoplenavy = travelers, not so hard to get in, a lot to domarines = killers, sharp and tough, you will be busy always..a lot of pride</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on News November 2011 by Andi</title>
		<link>http://fluidian.fr/en/2011/12/13/news-november-2011/#comment-9</link>
		<dc:creator>Andi</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 May 2012 06:39:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fluidian.fr/?p=1891#comment-9</guid>
		<description>My brother was in the Marines for 6 years and his bgisegt regret was that he was unable to do any school. He deployed halfway through every single class he took  I&#039;m in the USAF, so I am prejudiced towards it, and can&#039;t speak about the other branches.We offer a Tuition Assistance program that pays for $4500 annually in school. I&#039;ve been going to school online, and fulltime since I joined 3 years ago and have finished an associates and am about half way through a bachelors. We also have many, many commissioning opportunities if thats what you want also.To reach the higher enlisted ranks you have to have certain degrees, and the same for officers. School is STRONGLY encouraged in order to get good marks on your annual ratings. The new GI Bill is beautiful too, no matter what service you&#039;re in. Working fulltime and school fulltime will be hard no matter what branch you choose, but it sounds like you can handle it, esp if you&#039;ve been working two jobs to stay afloat right now.Ignore the people that tout their service as better for suchandsuch reasons, unless those reasons are the ones that are motivating you to join the military. Its a sacrifice and a commitment that only you can make, and just be sure you&#039;re doing it for reasons that satisfy you. Don&#039;t do it because you want to be hooyah.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>My brother was in the Marines for 6 years and his bgisegt regret was that he was unable to do any school. He deployed halfway through every single class he took  I&#8217;m in the USAF, so I am prejudiced towards it, and can&#8217;t speak about the other branches.We offer a Tuition Assistance program that pays for $4500 annually in school. I&#8217;ve been going to school online, and fulltime since I joined 3 years ago and have finished an associates and am about half way through a bachelors. We also have many, many commissioning opportunities if thats what you want also.To reach the higher enlisted ranks you have to have certain degrees, and the same for officers. School is STRONGLY encouraged in order to get good marks on your annual ratings. The new GI Bill is beautiful too, no matter what service you&#8217;re in. Working fulltime and school fulltime will be hard no matter what branch you choose, but it sounds like you can handle it, esp if you&#8217;ve been working two jobs to stay afloat right now.Ignore the people that tout their service as better for suchandsuch reasons, unless those reasons are the ones that are motivating you to join the military. Its a sacrifice and a commitment that only you can make, and just be sure you&#8217;re doing it for reasons that satisfy you. Don&#8217;t do it because you want to be hooyah.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on News November 2011 by chvmtrld</title>
		<link>http://fluidian.fr/en/2011/12/13/news-november-2011/#comment-8</link>
		<dc:creator>chvmtrld</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 May 2012 14:11:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fluidian.fr/?p=1891#comment-8</guid>
		<description>KILFYe  &lt;a href=&quot;http://ifkzqimigztv.com/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;ifkzqimigztv&lt;/a&gt;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>KILFYe  <a href="http://ifkzqimigztv.com/" rel="nofollow">ifkzqimigztv</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on News November 2011 by Ega</title>
		<link>http://fluidian.fr/en/2011/12/13/news-november-2011/#comment-7</link>
		<dc:creator>Ega</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 May 2012 12:04:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fluidian.fr/?p=1891#comment-7</guid>
		<description>You can request to rerutn to active duty.The Secretary of your branch of the military, must approve it.If you come back, you recieve active duty pay and are no longer retired, so do not recieve retirement pay.It as if you nver left.,So you have to retire all over again.No, you cannot change service branch&#039;s.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You can request to rerutn to active duty.The Secretary of your branch of the military, must approve it.If you come back, you recieve active duty pay and are no longer retired, so do not recieve retirement pay.It as if you nver left.,So you have to retire all over again.No, you cannot change service branch&#8217;s.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on News November 2011 by vljersvc</title>
		<link>http://fluidian.fr/en/2011/12/13/news-november-2011/#comment-6</link>
		<dc:creator>vljersvc</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 May 2012 06:23:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fluidian.fr/?p=1891#comment-6</guid>
		<description>WCCs5B  &lt;a href=&quot;http://xcrdvliaduwy.com/&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;xcrdvliaduwy&lt;/a&gt;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>WCCs5B  <a href="http://xcrdvliaduwy.com/" rel="nofollow">xcrdvliaduwy</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on News November 2011 by Alicia</title>
		<link>http://fluidian.fr/en/2011/12/13/news-november-2011/#comment-5</link>
		<dc:creator>Alicia</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 May 2012 21:15:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fluidian.fr/?p=1891#comment-5</guid>
		<description>This is just some speculation in resnopse to the author’s analysis of “managed chaos,” specifically Chaudhry’s argument, with respect to the “myriad and mysterious” U.S. government agencies, private contractors, and local collaborators at work in the region, that “the American will to manage is not matched by capacity,” that “the nefarious arms of the US military machine are pursuing radically different strategies that are more often than not at odds with each other,” that “the ever more fragmented covert, private and informal combatants in the pay of US tax payers have no idea what they are doing,” that, “[c]haos, in other words, has become the internal (dis)organizational idiom of the American military machine.” These observations, which may be accurate as far as they go at the level of the U.S. nation-state, can obviously be given a different interpretation using Don’s idea, advanced in his piece,  Barak, Badiou, and Bilal Al Hasan,  that there is emerging an “international Pinkertons” organization serving a global ruling class. (This  secret privatized intelligence gathering system and a privatized military capability  has actually been under construction  since the mid-twentieth century,  but now  operat[es] within the context of a global capitalism, not a national state,  and is aimed at problems for class rule stemming from  structural limits on capitalism.  (d.h.)) Then we have a site and agency of management located at the transnational level, but occasionally operating in conflict with, and circumventing a still active older managerial system, the national, “American”, part of the military machine, which is also not prepared for asymetrical warfare. What looks like a “fragmented” group of combatants from a nation-state centered point of view is this new, “de-territorialized” repressive apparatus (I’m not comfortable yet with the notion of a “territorially de-centered” political and economic system). What may be a real “(dis)organization[]… of the American military machine” may be related to the broader issue raised by Don about global capital’s problems in operating through the nation-state system. The transnational capitalist class has not achieved clear hegemony over the U.S. repressive apparatus, with different organizations in the apparatus being more or less representative of the interests of that class fraction. (I think Chaudhry&#039;s notion of  seriality  and  synchronicity,  if I could understand it better, could be used as part of a  global ruling class  argument.)Further, as Don suggested in his “Barak…” piece, the global ruling class, or at least its U.S. segment, is not monolithic, with factions entertaining alternative strategies towards the terrorist right in Asia as part of a different approaches to maintaining global capitalism in general. (This is already going too far into arguments about the larger “Great Game” paradigm of Chaudhry’s fascinating article, but look at Thomas Friedman’s most recent editorial disagreeing with the Obama administration’s Afghanistan policy (New York Times, June 22), where he compares the relative strategic significance of Iraq and Afghanistan. Friedman didn’t even mention the recent discovery of huge mineral reserves in Afghanistan.)(I’m thinking of empirically exploring the “transnational Pinkertons” idea by looking for possible transnational linkages of the private spy-assassin network active in “Af-Pak” that was recently the subject of several New York Times articles. Whether or not this network is part of a larger covert private-state organization strategically guided by a global ruling class, it looks to me that at least the leading private operatives are very close to elements in the official military leadership structure, not running amok completely independent of the military command, as Chaudhry believes. For example, one of the figures in the  Af-Pak  spy network case, Thomas Owens, executive vice president of Strategic Influence Alternatives, was recently a panel moderator at a high-level military conference on information warfare ( InfoWarCon ): members of the panel, on  Homeland Psychological Defense,  included the Director-General of the Swedish Ministry of Defence, and an officer in charge of  information operations  at NORAD and the US Northern Command.)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is just some speculation in resnopse to the author’s analysis of “managed chaos,” specifically Chaudhry’s argument, with respect to the “myriad and mysterious” U.S. government agencies, private contractors, and local collaborators at work in the region, that “the American will to manage is not matched by capacity,” that “the nefarious arms of the US military machine are pursuing radically different strategies that are more often than not at odds with each other,” that “the ever more fragmented covert, private and informal combatants in the pay of US tax payers have no idea what they are doing,” that, “[c]haos, in other words, has become the internal (dis)organizational idiom of the American military machine.” These observations, which may be accurate as far as they go at the level of the U.S. nation-state, can obviously be given a different interpretation using Don’s idea, advanced in his piece,  Barak, Badiou, and Bilal Al Hasan,  that there is emerging an “international Pinkertons” organization serving a global ruling class. (This  secret privatized intelligence gathering system and a privatized military capability  has actually been under construction  since the mid-twentieth century,  but now  operat[es] within the context of a global capitalism, not a national state,  and is aimed at problems for class rule stemming from  structural limits on capitalism.  (d.h.)) Then we have a site and agency of management located at the transnational level, but occasionally operating in conflict with, and circumventing a still active older managerial system, the national, “American”, part of the military machine, which is also not prepared for asymetrical warfare. What looks like a “fragmented” group of combatants from a nation-state centered point of view is this new, “de-territorialized” repressive apparatus (I’m not comfortable yet with the notion of a “territorially de-centered” political and economic system). What may be a real “(dis)organization[]… of the American military machine” may be related to the broader issue raised by Don about global capital’s problems in operating through the nation-state system. The transnational capitalist class has not achieved clear hegemony over the U.S. repressive apparatus, with different organizations in the apparatus being more or less representative of the interests of that class fraction. (I think Chaudhry&#8217;s notion of  seriality  and  synchronicity,  if I could understand it better, could be used as part of a  global ruling class  argument.)Further, as Don suggested in his “Barak…” piece, the global ruling class, or at least its U.S. segment, is not monolithic, with factions entertaining alternative strategies towards the terrorist right in Asia as part of a different approaches to maintaining global capitalism in general. (This is already going too far into arguments about the larger “Great Game” paradigm of Chaudhry’s fascinating article, but look at Thomas Friedman’s most recent editorial disagreeing with the Obama administration’s Afghanistan policy (New York Times, June 22), where he compares the relative strategic significance of Iraq and Afghanistan. Friedman didn’t even mention the recent discovery of huge mineral reserves in Afghanistan.)(I’m thinking of empirically exploring the “transnational Pinkertons” idea by looking for possible transnational linkages of the private spy-assassin network active in “Af-Pak” that was recently the subject of several New York Times articles. Whether or not this network is part of a larger covert private-state organization strategically guided by a global ruling class, it looks to me that at least the leading private operatives are very close to elements in the official military leadership structure, not running amok completely independent of the military command, as Chaudhry believes. For example, one of the figures in the  Af-Pak  spy network case, Thomas Owens, executive vice president of Strategic Influence Alternatives, was recently a panel moderator at a high-level military conference on information warfare ( InfoWarCon ): members of the panel, on  Homeland Psychological Defense,  included the Director-General of the Swedish Ministry of Defence, and an officer in charge of  information operations  at NORAD and the US Northern Command.)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>Comment on News November 2011 by Bugti</title>
		<link>http://fluidian.fr/en/2011/12/13/news-november-2011/#comment-4</link>
		<dc:creator>Bugti</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 May 2012 18:34:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://fluidian.fr/?p=1891#comment-4</guid>
		<description>Degeaba pun afise pe stalpi, daca nu facem nimic nu svalam zona, patrimoniu se degradeaza in continuare si oamenii mor de foame oare unde erau ecologistii cand o zona cu potential turistic extrem de mare a primit autorizatia de deschidere a unei mine? Aici ma refer la Ranca. Ecologistii au vedere stricta pentru rosia montana</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Degeaba pun afise pe stalpi, daca nu facem nimic nu svalam zona, patrimoniu se degradeaza in continuare si oamenii mor de foame oare unde erau ecologistii cand o zona cu potential turistic extrem de mare a primit autorizatia de deschidere a unei mine? Aici ma refer la Ranca. Ecologistii au vedere stricta pentru rosia montana</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>

